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Environmental Tort
Litigation in China
by Adam Moser and Tseming Yang
Adam Moser is China Environment Fellow, U.S.-China Partnership for Environmental Law, Vermont Law School. 
Tseming Yang is Professor of Law, Vermont Law School, and Visiting Professor, Sun Yat-Sen University Law
School, as well as Former Director and Chief of Party, U.S.-China Partnership for Environmental Law.

T

he use of environmental tort claims to compensate
pollution victims or to protect the environment and
human health is still in an early stage of development in China.  Nevertheless, tort cases play an outsized
role in China’s environmental law system. From 2004 to
2009, China’s courts heard more environmental pollutionrelated tort cases than pollution-related administrative
and criminal cases combined. Since 1998, the number of
environmental lawsuits filed with the courts increased at
an annual average of 25%.1 This rise corresponded with
a large rise in civil disputes and tort claims in general.2
From 1981 to 2009, the number of civil lawsuits handled
by courts rose by nearly 400%; the courts received over 8.8
million applications for civil and administrative lawsuits in
2009.3 In recent years, roughly 100,000 applications were
filed annually as environmental lawsuits with the people’s
court. On average, only 1-3% of all the environmental lawAuthors’ Note: This Comment, one of several, was prepared for U.S.
Department of Justice and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
officials participating in a set of round tables in May 2010 on
environmental enforcement in Beijing and Guangzhou involving
senior officials from the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Supreme
People’s Court, and Ministry of Environmental Protection, Guangzhou
Maritime Court, other government officials, and environmental law
scholars. Preparation of this Comment was supported by the U.S.
Agency for International Development and Vermont Law School.
Adam Moser is a former volunteer with the Center for Legal Assistance
to Pollution Victims at the China University of Political Science and
Law, and researcher at Shandong University Law School’s Human
Rights Research Center; these experiences were made possible with
support from the University of Cincinnati College of Law’s Urban
Morgan Institute for Human Rights.
1.	
2.	

3.	

Tun Lin et al., Green Benches: What Can the People’s Republic of
China Learn From Environment Courts of Other Countries?, Asian
Development Bank 5 (2009).
In the Chinese legal system, administrative actions are classified separately
from civil actions because they are brought before the people’s courts under
the Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
and not the Civil Procedure Law of the PRC.
Supreme People’s Court 2009 Annual Report to China’s National People’s
Congress (Mar. 11, 2010).
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suits filed will actually be adjudicated before people’s court
judges. From 2004 through 2008, there were over 10,700
environmental tort cases before the courts nationwide. In
2009, there were over one million tort actions decided,
1,783 of which were environmental torts.
These numbers suggest an increasing importance and
a growing role for environmental tort law.  However, the
numbers do not provide a sense of the challenges that environmental tort plaintiffs and lawyers continue to face in
China. Courts are not required to release opinions to the
public, nor is there a centralized system for collecting and
disseminating court decisions from around the nation. A
search of one of China’s primary legal databases shows only
79 environmental tort decisions available; a non-negligible portion concerned noise and light pollution. Another
database only turned up 42 such cases for the period
2000 to 2007.4 A Chinese nongovernmental organization
(NGO), the Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims (CLAPV), maintains its own database of cases that
it has assisted with.  Between 1999 and September 2009,
CLAPV received over 12,000 complaints and requests for
assistance; it offered direct assistance in 135 cases, of which
70 cases were officially closed by the courts.

I.

The Cultural and Historical Context of
Civil Litigation in China

It is generally accepted that corruption and local protectionism often unduly influence court decisions regarding civil
cases in China.5 But it would be an oversimplification to
characterize such interventions as purely rogue.  There are
cultural, developmental, and systematic elements within
China’s legal system that facilitate political intervention by
both local and national-level authorities. First, law in China
primarily exists as a tool to facilitate the administration of
the country and society and enable the ruler to achieve gov4.	
5.	

Rachel Stern, On the Frontlines: Making Decisions in Chinese Civil Environmental Lawsuits, 32 Law & Pol’y 1, 79, 80 (Jan. 2010).
Randall Peerenboom, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law 281
(2002).
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ernmental objectives more effectively, not to protect individual rights or impose limits on the power of the ruler.6
Such a philosophy helps explain why courts often place an
emphasis on social stability as the current overriding government objective, over individual “legal” rights.
Second, since ancient times, Chinese legal systems have
strongly favored nonadversarial forms of dispute settlement, and the current court’s position on promoting dispute resolution remains strong. While complete data is not
available for all environmental tort cases nationwide, it is
estimated that nearly one-half of all environmental tort
cases are decided through court-managed mediation. From
2006 through 2010, courts in Jiangsu Province handled a
total of 504 environmental tort cases, of those, 304 (61%)
were resolved through mediation.7
Third, for all intents and purposes, China’s present legal
system only began to operate as a venue for adjudicating
civil disputes around 1978.8 At a meeting in 1978, the
then-Supreme People’s Court President, Jiang Hua, argued
that civil cases should be treated as important as criminal trials.  Jiang Hua then elaborated on why civil cases
deserved more attention from the courts, and laid a jurisprudential foundation that would influence how Chinese
judges approach civil cases up through the present day.9
Civil cases concern the interests of the state, collectives,
and individuals . . . and affect the harmony of the family,
stability of society and the construction of the four modernizations10 . . .  when handling civil cases the people’s
courts must take the overall interest into account in making decisions and the decisions have to be not only lawful,
but appropriate and reasonable.11

While a court’s decision should be lawful, a reasonable
decision “must” consider the “overall interests,” presumably
of the state and society. In recent practice, overall interests
have been defined as protecting social stability. In practice,
that has meant preserving the status quo, which generally
supports immediate economic growth, and ensuring that
there is no imminent threat of large-scale social conflicts. 
These factors, in addition to law and justice, continue to
influence how judges decide cases in China.
This approach to civil jurisprudence goes well beyond
common-law notions of balancing the equities, or weighing the social utility of how one uses land or property, as
6.	

Not only is this common amongst statist socialist regimes, but this notion
can be traced back to the ancient Chinese philosophy of legalism, and its
founder Han Feizi (280-213 B.C.). While legalism held that law should rule
the country rather than an individual, its focus was on law as a utilitarian
tool to assist the ruler, not as something to protect the rights of the governed
or limit the ruler.
7.	 Yan Yan et al., China Environment News, June 21, 2011, http://www.cenews.com.cn/xwzx/fz/qt/201106/t20110620_703500.html.
8.	 Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to Adjudicated Justice: The Limits of Civil Justice Reform in China 11-12 (Oct. 2007),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1306800.
9.	 Id.  at 12 (citing Civil Adjudication Is Equally Important, in Jiang Hua
Zhuan, The Biography of Jiang Hua §5, ch. 16 (2007)).
10. The “four modernizations” refer to central plans to modernize agriculture,
industry, national defense, and science and technology.
11. Hualing & Cullen, supra note 8, at 13.
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found in common-law nuisance cases.  China’s Supreme
People’s Court is very conscious of the need to adapt its
approach to handling cases to the perceived challenges and
broader political or economic climate.  Sometimes such
judicial responses are formal, other times they are not. A
recent example involves a semiformal policy response by
the courts to the international financial crisis.12
Clearly, the promotion of economic growth has driven
state policy for several decades. It is evident that the courts’
promotion of pro-growth policies could potentially be
detrimental to plaintiffs who aim to force industries to
internalize the costs of pollution. Additionally, those environmental tort cases that pit common individuals against
larger economic actors make them susceptible to the
courts’ “duty” to preference economic growth and stability
over legally recognized rights.13 China’s twelfth five-year
plan, which covers the 2011 to 2016 time period, seeks to
cool economic growth and provide more sustainable development. It remains unclear whether the plan’s sustainable
development rhetoric will influence how the legal system
addresses environmental tort cases.

II.

Chinese Statutory Law and Practice in
Environmental Tort Cases

While the cultural, political, and historical influences on
the Chinese legal system have created substantial challenges for plaintiffs bringing environmental tort actions,
China’s statutory law has designed certain doctrinal elements to favor plaintiffs.
The core principles of private enforcement of China’s
pollution control laws can be found in the civil liability
principles of Article 124 of the General Principles of the
Civil Law and Article 41 of the 1989 Environmental Protection Law.
Article 124 of the General Principles of the Civil Law of
the People’s Republic of China provides:
Any person who pollutes the environment and causes
damages to others in violation of state provisions for environmental protection and the prevention of pollution
shall bear civil liability in accordance with the law.

Article 41 of the 1989 Environmental Protection Law
states:
A unit14 that has caused an environmental pollution hazard shall have the obligation to eliminate it and make
12. In the Supreme People’s Court’s 2009 Annual Report to the 2010 National
People’s Congress, the international financial crisis was mentioned 13 times,
and almost exclusively in the context of what the courts were doing to help
address it.  The report highlights that several provincial high courts have
released policy statements specifically promoting economic development
goals to their lower courts in response to the financial crisis.
13. Generally, the courts’ ability to exercise this “duty” or permit other factors
beyond law and fact to impact its decision can be reduced substantially in
cases led or supported by the Procuratorate. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate is a government body at the same level as the Supreme People’s Court,
but is generally considered more politically powerful.
14. Under the formerly centrally planned economy, virtually all organized entities, including business entities, were controlled by the state and designated

Copyright © 2011 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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compensation to the unit or individual that suffered direct
losses.  A dispute over the liability to make compensation or the amount of compensation may, at the request
of the parties, be settled by the competent department
of environmental protection administration or another
department invested by law with power to conduct environmental supervision and management. If a party refuses
to accept the decision on the settlement, it may bring a suit
before a people’s court. The party may also directly bring a
suit before the people’s court.
If environmental pollution losses result solely from irresistible natural disasters which cannot be averted even
after the prompt adoption of reasonable measures, the
party concerned shall be exempted from liability.

However, many practitioners and scholars also argue that
ambiguities of law and regulations continue to limit citizen
rights and offer discretion to the courts to deny relief.15 In
addition to bringing tort claims against polluters directly
for harms, pollution victims can at times use administrative litigation to challenge government actions that have
contributed to or licensed pollution. In both tort case and
administrative action, the most common form of redress is a
payment for damages or fines. Because of difficulties ensuring compliance, it is rare for a court to require environmental remediation or behavioral change from a polluter.
Most recently, China’s National People’s Congress
passed a new tort law (effective July 2010) that for the first
time explicitly and formally addresses liability for environmental pollution.16 Though consistent with the existing
body of law, its inclusion of a specific chapter on environmental pollution liability (Chapter 8) and its codification
of rules that have previously been controversial is expected
to clarify ambiguities and benefit plaintiffs. Articles 65 and
66 of the Tort Law unambiguously state that the burden of
proof in environmental tort actions is on the polluter.
Article 65 of the 2009 Tort Law:
Where any harm is caused by environmental pollution,
the polluter shall assume the tort liability.

Article 66 of the 2009 Tort Law:
Where any dispute arises over an environmental pollution,
the polluter shall assume the burden to prove that it should
not be liable or its liability could be mitigated under certain
circumstances as provided for by law or to prove that there
is no causation between its conduct and the harm.

Previously, the shifting of the burden of proof from the
victim plaintiff to the polluter-defendant was based prias “work units.” Legislation that preceded China’s opening up in the late
1970s /early 1980s and transition to a market economy (which led to a
proliferation of privately owned enterprises) still refers to such units as the
responsible entities for purposes of the law. The 1989 Environmental Protection Law was originally enacted in 1979 on a trial basis and then continued in its effectiveness in 1989.
15. Benjamin Van Rooij, People v. Pollution: Understanding Citizen Action
Against Pollution in China, 19 J. Contemp. China 63, 68 (2010).
16. Tort Liability Law of the People’s Republic of China, Dec. 26, 2009, available at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2009-12/26/content_1497435.htm.
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marily on a 2001 interpretive regulation of the Supreme
People’s Court, which specifically stated: “In compensation
lawsuits concerning environmental pollution, the polluter
carries the burden of proof with respect to . . . demonstrating the lack of causal link between the polluter’s actions
and the harmful result.”17
It is still too early to know whether Articles 65 and 66
of the 2009 Tort Law will actually benefit plaintiffs. Plaintiff’s lawyers often claim that judges do not apply Article
66 correctly.  Judges claim that China’s Civil Procedure
Law sets a high bar for plaintiffs. Before accepting a case,
most courts require substantial evidence from the plaintiff
as to the harm, the source of harm, and even evidence of a
causal link. However, even after an environmental tort case
is accepted, the plaintiff will likely need to provide additional evidence linking the harm to the polluter, only then
will the court shift the burden of proof to the defendant.18
A further new provision of the tort law is Article 68,
which many scholars believe codifies existing law that polluters are subject to no-fault liability.19
Article 68 of the 2009 Tort Law:
Where any harm is caused by environmental pollution for
the fault of a third party, the victim may require compensation from either the polluter or the third party.  After
making compensation, the polluter shall be entitled to be
reimbursed by the third party.

Though these principles have previously been raised in
other relevant environmental laws, their former exclusion
from the tort law provided ample room for polluters to craft
legal arguments why such principles should not be applied
to them, an argument many courts were willing to accept.
Under Chinese law, the applicable statute of limitation
for environmental tort claims is three years “from the time
that the party becomes aware of or should become aware
of the pollution losses.20 This is one year longer than the
statute of limitations for other tort cases. Plaintiffs are also
required to pay a case “acceptance fee” of .5% to 4% of the
compensation requested of the court. The loser of a lawsuit
ultimately becomes responsible for this fee.  While plaintiffs may petition to reduce, waive, or postpone payment
of the fee, the requirement creates a deterrent effect that
makes it difficult for indigent plaintiffs to bring claims. 
Furthermore, some courts may rely significantly on such
fees for their operational budget, hence creating disincentives for waivers. There can also be other fees.
Plaintiffs often also face so-called “other litigation costs”
that are levied at the court’s discretion and which can be
a source of abuse. If a losing defendant does not pay the
amount ordered by the court, the plaintiff must pay a fee
17. Supreme People’s Court Various Regulations Regarding Evidence for Civil
Suits (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct. Dec. 6, 2001, effective Apr. 1,
2002) (quoted in Alex Wang, The Role of Law in Environmental Protection in
China, 8 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 196, 209 (2007)).
18. Interview With Chinese Environmental Court Judge, June 2011 (notes on
file with author).
19. Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China (2009).
20. 1989 Environmental Protection Law, art. 42.
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to institute execution proceedings. . . . Appraisal fees in
pollution compensation cases can also be prohibitive. In
pollution compensation cases, appraisals by a certified,
court-appointed entity typically provide the key court evidence regarding damages and causation.21

Standing issues (locus standi) have arisen in the context
of joint action lawsuits (very similar to class actions) and
in public interest litigation (asserting a general community
or society interest not specific to a particular individual). 
How each of these fits into China’s legal system remains
generally unresolved. Article 55 of China’s Civil Procedure
Law and Article 88 of the Water Pollution Law permit
joint action suits. In practice, however, courts are granted
a lot of discretion in deciding whether or not to permit
joint actions.  Because this discretion is provided even at
the basic court level (the lowest level court in China’s judiciary), it can amplify the effects of local protectionism.22

III. Environmental Tort Litigation in the
Context of the Xinfang and Mediation
Processes
Since the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, China
has sought to rebuild its judiciary, especially by striving
to increase the level of professionalism and qualifications
of judges. Nevertheless, the traditional “Xinfang” system
of petitioning higher level government officials to correct
the perceived failings of their lower level counterparts has
persisted as an important avenue for common citizens to
seek relief when other options have failed. Literally translated, “Xinfang” means “letters and visits”—the process
by which private citizens file petitions with Xinfang offices
of various government agencies at successively higher levels of government to seek administrative intervention and
redress for grievances against the government bureaucracy
or other entities or persons.23 At its core, one might analogize such efforts to a private citizen seeking the assistance
of members of the U.S. Congress in addressing problems
and grievances with particular federal agencies, for example. While Xinfang petitions generate responses from the
government, only a small fraction leads to positive remedies for the petitioners.  And while it is a time-honored
practice, it has also remained controversial.
In pollution situations, a victim might directly petition
the local environmental protection bureau (EPB) to investigate the pollution, to identify the source of pollution, the
specific pollutant, and to provide relief.  If the EPB finds
the pollution to be harmful, the EPB may suggest that the
relevant parties engage in mediation under the EPB’s guidance. The authority of EPBs to facilitate mediation processes
21. Wang, supra note 17, at 212.
22. Id. at 192.
23. The Xinfang system has roots in ancient China’s imperial governance structure, where the emperor might intervene to mete out justice or other imperial largess to a petitioner’s grievances.  For a general discussion, see Carl
Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42
Stan. J. Int’l L. 103 (2006).
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between victims and polluters to settle environmental tort
claims, in fact, is statutorily set out in provisions in various
environmental laws, including Article 41 of the 1989 Environmental Protection Law. If at the end of administrative
mediation the victim is not satisfied with the outcome, or
the polluter fails to perform under the mediation agreement,
the victim can then file a tort claim against the polluter with
the local court. It is not, however, a prerequisite that citizens
inform the local EPB of an issue before filing suit.
Both petitioning and mediation processes continue to
be used widely by the citizenry. In fact, their widespread
use in response to pollution issues suggests a set of reasons
for why environmental tort litigation and use of the courts
as venues for remedies has not increased nearly as much
as the growth in pollution and environmental problems
would otherwise suggest. Distrust of the legal system, combined with the traditional roots of the petitioning system
and a general preference of mediation over litigation as a
tool for resolving disputes in China, has limited the rise of
environmental tort cases.

IV.

Major Challenges for More Effective
Use of Environmental Tort Litigation

The future impacts of the 2009 Tort Law notwithstanding,
there are several important obstacles facing plaintiffs suing
to redress damages or enforce the law.  First, among the
most significant challenges remains the cost of filing cases
and the difficulties of finding competent lawyers trained in
environmental law able to provide assistance to pollution
victims. Second, there are significant challenges to proving
and quantifying damages; victims must frequently depend
on “experts from law firms, NGOs, or local environmental
or other authorities, including for instance agricultural or
fishery bureaus.”24
Third is the challenge of proving the defendant’s polluting activities, as enterprises do their best to hide pollution. In one case studied, a company added a substance to
the water that made it impossible to detect that the original pollution had created a hydrogen ion concentration
(pH) level that exceeded the relevant water quality standards there. In another case, even a report by a local EPB
attesting to the existence of indoor pollution was deemed
insufficient evidence, because the court ruled that it lacked
details about “the scope of the pollution.”25
Fourth is the more general challenge of showing causation. While the 2001 Supreme People’s Court’s interpretive
regulations already placed the burden of proof for causation
on the defendant, thereby relieving the plaintiffs of that
obstacle to proving their claim, some “local courts [continued to] rule against plaintiffs because [plaintiffs] were not
able to provide evidence for the causal relationship between
the polluting act and the damages incurred.”26
24. Supra note 19, at 68-70.
25. Id.
26. Id.

Copyright © 2011 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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The issue of evidence collection for both causation and
damages is a major burden for plaintiffs, even though they
do not technically shoulder the burden of proof. In general, Chinese courts give great deference to reports from
official or certified entities that assess the environmental
damage or the causal link between the pollution and the
harm. This is a problem for several reasons. The costs associated with getting a scientific study can be very high. If
the plaintiff disagrees with a report from a certified entity,
it can be difficult to find another certified entity to provide an additional report, and courts regularly discredit or
ignore reports from entities that do not have official certification. Some environmental advocates and scholars claim
that because polluters generally have more money and
influence than pollution victims, they are able to influence
the outcome of certified reports. Because environmental
cases often involve complex scientific issues, and because
many judges are unfamiliar with how to synthesize scientific uncertainty with legal liability, judges very rarely stray
from the outcomes contained in a certified report. A certified report on causation or damages is often unassailable
evidence that will determine the court’s decision.
Finally, local protectionism remains an important
impediment to just resolution of environmental tort
claims. As described elsewhere, it means that local government agencies favor industries or look the other way when
pollution causes harm, simply because polluters frequently
provide significant economic benefits to local jurisdictions. Because such cases oftentimes pit poor and less-vocal
plaintiffs against large enterprises or government agencies,
the susceptibility of courts to such influence from local
government officials remains a serious challenge.

V.

China’s Environmental Courts: If  You
Build It, Will They Come?

The recent emergence of environmental courts (e-courts)
or e-tribunals in China is a pragmatic response to the fact
that there is inadequate enforcement from government
agencies and that most courts were unwilling or unable to
justly adjudicate public enforcement actions. Since 2007,
over 40 e-courts and e-tribunals have been established in
China at the intermediate and lower levels in the provinces,
primarily to enhance the judicial enforcement of pollution
laws. In fact, some of these courts have granted standing
for plaintiffs, organizations, and government agencies to
sue on behalf of the public interest. The Kunming City
Court even developed a special fund to help cover the costs
of litigation for plaintiffs suing in the public interest. However, the vast majority of cases brought to the e-courts have
been routine administrative and criminal actions, though
the number of such cases has risen in the e-courts since
their establishment.27
27. Gao Jie, Environmental Public Interest Litigation and the Vitality
of Environmental Courts: The Development and Future of Environmental Courts in China 16 (2010).

41 ELR 10899

At the end of 2010, there had been 15 public interest suits
decided in the e-courts, and all but five were brought by
local procuratorates. Of the cases not brought by government prosecutors, one was brought by the Kunming City
EPB as a public interest case, in part, to force compliance
with orders and fines that the bureau previously issued.
One was brought by a local city government, and another
by a local government bureau. Two cases were brought
by an official state-sponsored NGO under the Ministry
of Environmental Protection (MEP), the All China Environment Federation (ACEF). In all of these public interest
actions, plaintiffs generally prevailed.28 Scholars in China
point to these cases as examples of the good that can come
from promoting more public enforcement and expanding
public interest standing. Although there have only been
a few cases filed with courts, none of China’s courts have
accepted a case brought by a true NGO as plaintiff in the
name of the public interest. Some scholars are concerned
that the current trend will limit public interest litigation
standing to government entities or organizations with
strong government support.
Because a major justification for these courts is to
increase public enforcement, their survival is questionable, if more public actions and public interest cases are
not brought. Some scholars question the legal validity of
the e-courts’ provisions granting standing to organizations
suing in the public interest, as Article 108 of China’s Civil
Procedure Law requires that plaintiffs have a direct interest
in the case. But to date, the Supreme People’s Court has
allowed the e-courts to experiment with their expanded
standing provisions. How much longer will the courts persist if public enforcement and public interest cases do not
increase? And will the Supreme People’s Court or other
legislation legitimize the e-courts and their standing provisions in the near future? For the time being, the e-courts
are an exciting pragmatic experiment that speaks more to
China’s environmental enforcement challenges than to the
power of public enforcement.

VI. The Center for Legal Assistance
to Pollution Victims (at the China
University of Political Science and Law)
The CLAPV is one of the most successful environmental
NGOs in China and has received significant international
media attention. It is also the only environmental law
NGO that is independent of the government. Founded
by Prof. Wang Canfa in 1999, it has represented pollution
victims from all over China and recovered significant pollution compensation for its clients.

28. Lin Yanmei, Environmental Judicial Bulletin (Huanjing Sifa Tongxun)
Second Edition DRAFT, 2011, at 21, available at http://chinaenvironmentalgovernance.com/2011/07/12/china-environmental-law-newsletter-andcurriculum-development-for-judges/.
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CLAPV Cases 1999-200929
Air
Water
Noise
CLAPV Cases Pollution Pollution Pollution Other Total
Won
12
13
4
3
32
Lost
8
5
3
10
26
Judicial
1
2
1
0
4
Mediation
Admin.
2
3
2
1
8
Mediation
No decision
26
23
5
11
65
or unfinished
Total
135
49
46
15
25

APPENDIX:
CLAPV cases, as described by Professor and lawyer Wang
Canfa:
(1) Improving the Environment Through Litigation: 97
Families in Shiliang River Reservoir of Jiangsu Province v. Factories in Limnu County of Shandong Province for Pollution Damages30
The Plaintiffs were 97 families in Shilianghe River Reservoir who had bred fish in net cages since July 1997. From
July 1999 through June 2000, large fish kills occurred
within the reservoir on three separate occasions. The confirmed cause of these incidents was found to be Linmu
County Paper Mill of the Shandong Province and Linmu
Chemical Plant of Shandong Province. Together, the
plants discharged a sizeable amount of sewage into the
reservoir, suffocating the fish in large numbers. The Plaintiffs brought action in the Intermediate People’s Court
of Lianyungang City of Jiangsu Province, requesting an
injunction for the two parties, damages in the amount of
RMB [Renminbi] 5,652,000 Yuan (US$ 730,185), and
attorneys fees. The court found in favor of the Plaintiffs and
required the Defendants to bear joint liability. The Defendants appealed to the High People’s Court of Jiangsu Province on April 16, 2002. After a hearing, the court affirmed
the judgment of the intermediate court. More than a year
since the judgment became effective, however, Defendants
had yet to compensate the families. The CLAPV and its
lawyers became involved and were able to secure RMB
5,600,000 Yuan (US$ 723,467) in payment. The most
important effects of this litigation are that the defendants
dare not discharge sewage into the reservoir again, and fish
are once again abundant.

29. CLAPV 10th Anniversary materials (on file with author).
30. Wang Canfa, Chinese Environmental Law Enforcement: Current Deficiencies
and Suggested Reforms, 8 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 159, 179 (2007), available at
http://www.vjel.org/journal/pdf/VJEL10058.pdf.
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(2) Local Government Action Protecting Polluters and
Hindering Enforcement of Environmental Laws: Li
Jianguo and Four Victims in Laoting County of Hebei
Province Are Accused of Disrupting the Social Order
by Assembling in a Crowd and Blackmail31
Li Jianguo and four other victims were peasants living on
the bank of the Tingliu River, Laoting County of Hebei
Province. In February 2000, Lefeng Steel Plant, which lies
to the east of Li Jianguo’s village, began to manufacture
steel. According to the related laws and regulations, the steel
plant was a severe polluter and should have been closed.
It had not completed either an environmental protection
examination or approval procedures during its construction, and there were no active environmental protective
measures in place. The factory seriously polluted the local
environment. In May 2000, crops and vegetation around
the plant began to wither and die. The village leader, Zhao
Wentu, and several other victims reported the incidents to
the local authorities and the county environmental protection agency, but nothing was done. Because of this inaction, 100 villagers blocked the door to the plant, stopping
steel production and the noxious emissions. The villagers
elected six people as representatives, including Li Jianguo.
These representatives petitioned the government to close
the plant in accordance with pertinent environmental laws
and regulations. Meanwhile, the crowd was disbanded
by the police, and the representatives were arrested and
released on bail pending a trial.
In October 2000, Li Jianguo and other villagers
sought legal assistance from the CLAPV, and in December 2000, they sued the government of Laoting County.
They requested that the court require the government to
fulfill its duties in accordance with the law and to order
the plant closed. During the litigation, the plant offered to
compensate the victims if they would withdraw their suit.
In January 2001, Li Jianguo and other victims accepted the
compensation of RMB 300,000 Yuan (US$ 38,757) and
withdrew their claims.
On February 6, 2003, however, the six representatives
were again detained for the crimes of racketeering and
inciting a mob; unfortunately because of a severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak, the CLAPV could
not offer legal assistance.32 On May 7, 2003, the People’s
Court of Laoting County held that the six village representatives had committed the crimes of inciting a mob and
racketeering and sentenced them to a maximum of four
years imprisonment. Li Jianguo and the others appealed
the decision, and the Intermediate People’s Court of Tangshan City sent the case back for a retrial. The CLAPV
offered legal assistance, and the trial was to be covered by
numerous newspapers and media outlets, but nothing was
reported by the media. On March 25, 2004, the People’s
Court of Laoting County found that the defendants com31. Id. at 181.
32. In the spring and summer of 2003, many government offices were closed
and travel was restricted to contain the spread of SARS in China.
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mitted the above crimes and sentenced the individuals to
one to four years in prison.
The Defendants appealed once again. The CLAPV consulted numerous criminal and environmental law experts,
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who determined that the defendants had not violated existing Chinese law. The last decision from the Intermediate
People’s Court of Tangshan City canceled the racketeering
crime, but the mob incitement was upheld.

